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by Gregory T. Phillips
Both American society and industry are becoming increas-
ingly dependent upon hazardous materials (explosives, gas-
es, corrosives, flammables, poisons, and radioactive materi-
als) to facilitate our high standard of living and the require
ments of modern technologically advanced industries. As
these materials become more widely used, the dangers in-
herent in their production, transport, and use spread. How-
ever, until recently, Americans have been much more inter,
ested in enjoying the benefits of the use of hazardous mate-
rials than in properly attending to the dangers they pose.
Recent events have sharpened public understanding of
the hazards posed by these substances. The near disaster at
the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant focused atten-
tion on the inherent dangers in the production of nuclear
energy. The chemical contamination discovered at Love
Canal in Niagara Falls, New York, and at Times Beach,
Missouri, have drawn attention to the hazards of the use
and improper disposal of the toxic chemicals so widely used
in industry. And while attention has focused on these envi-
ronmental problems, there is a growing awareness that the
transportation of hazardous materials poses health and
environmental dangers which may be equally great.'
While there has not been the sort of massive catastro-
phe which would focus national attention on the safety
aspects of hazardous materials transportation, there have
been many serious accidents which have brought home
these dangers on a local scale. As these accidents continue
to increase, pressure increases at all levels of government to
take steps to make hazardous materials transportation safer.
Despite a massive federal entry into the field of hazardous
materials transportation (which will be detailed below),
many states and localities have enacted laws and ordi,
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nances regulating transportation of these materials within
their boundaries. Because uncoordinated regulatory activi,
ty could adversely affect both public safety and economic
growth, the proper regulatory role of each level of govern,
ment-federal, state, and local-needs to be determined.
This article focuses on the role of localities-cities,
towns, and counties-in regulating the transportation of
hazardous materials within their boundaries. Because the
powers of localities are restrained by federal activity in this
area, an overview of the federal regulatory framework, in,
cluding criticisms of it, many of which have encouraged
regulatory activity on the local level, is useful. Local, and to
a lesser degree state, regulations are considered in the light
of the federal scheme. Here the focus will be on the historic
basis of local safety regulation-namely, the police power-
and an evaluation of specific local safety measures that
have been enacted. Finally, this author suggests a frame,
work for the proper role to be played by each level of
government.
One final note as to the scope of this article: the focus
will be on highway transportation of hazardous materials by
truck. Shipment of hazardous cargo by rail, air, or sea will
not be considered. These modes of transport involve many
of the same dangers as highway transport but are separate,
ly regulated by federal authorities and often are beyond the
regulatory impact of local legislation. Also, the transporta,
tion of nuclear fuels and wastes and radioactive materials
will be discussed as if they were a typical sub-group of
hazardous materials. This is not always necessarily the
case, as these materials are also separately regulated and
often involve hazards of a different nature than nonnuclear
materials. However, radioactive materials have been incor,
porated herein for two reasons. First, there is great public
concern over the transportation dangers of nuclear
materials, particularly through populous areas. Second,
some local regulations single out radioactive shipments for
special safety treatment, and these regulations have been
actively challenged in the courts, providing a body of legal
doctrine and research work which may be applicable to
nonradioactive safety regulation.
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THE FEDERAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The basic federal statute in this area is the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act (HMTA), enacted on Janu-
ary 3, 1975, and found at 49 U.S.C. 1801 et seq. The
HMTA concentrated the regulatory and enforcement
authority that had previously been delegated to the various
modal agencies (for example, the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration, the Federal Railroad Administration) in the hands
of the Secretary of Transportation. The HMTA authorized
the secretary to establish uniform reguilations governing the
movement of hazardous materials in interstate commerce
and in intrastate commerce affecting interstate commerce.
The secretary's authority under the HMTA reaches car-
riers and shippers of hazardous materials as well as manu-
facturers of containers used to transport hazardous mate-
rials.
Hazardous materials are defined in the HMTA (sec-
tions 1802 and 1803) as "a particular quantity and form" of
material which the secretary, "in his discretion," has deter-
mined "may pose an unreasonable risk to health and safety
or property when transported in commerce." The Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) has identified over eighteen
hundred such materials-from common household items
such as paint, matches, and charcoal briquets to extremely
hazardous materials such as plutonium, chlorine, and liqui-
fled petroleum gas.2
The HMTA (section 1804) empowers the secretary to
issue regulations governing "any safety aspect of the trans-
portation of hazardous materials," including packaging,
handling, labeling, and routing. Under this mandate, the
DOT has issued a very elaborate system of regulations that
occupy more than eleven hundred pages in the Code of FedL
eral Regulations? Finally, the secretary is given broad
enforcement powers, including authorization to conduct
investigations, hold hearings, inspect documents and prop-
erty, and impose civil and criminal penalties.
Despite the resources and energy that have been
expended to create the extensive federal regulatory system
described above, the system has generated much criticism
from such varied sources as spokesmen for the transporta-
tion industry, officials from local governments, and from
federal agencies and congressional panels charged with
evaluating the regulations. The alleged failure of the federal
regulatory system to adequately ensure the safe transporta-
tion of hazardous materials is often cited by local govern-
ments when they enact local safety ordinances.
According to a report by the General Accounting Of-
fice (GAO), the DOT's planning and operation of the fed-
eral hazardous materials transportation safety program is
severely hindered by a lack of adequate information. The
DOT does not know the identity of all the firms it is sup-
posed to regulate, the kinds of materials transported by
these carriers, nor the volume of materials being shipped.
As Albert B. Rosenbaum, III, assistant managing director
of the National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. (NTTC), put it,
"[Piresently, the enforcers are referees in a game where
they do not know who the players are." Futher, the DOT
relies on voluntary reports of accidents involving hazardous
materials transportation supplied by industry and generally
does not question the accounts it receives. This procedure
results in figures which seriously understate the number
and the impact of these accidents. In a report concerning
the improvement of hazardous materials transportation, the
GAO concluded: "DOT can neither determine the extent
of the problems involved in transporting hazardous materi-
als, nor assure the Congress-and the American public-
that it is using its limited staffing and funding resources effi-
ciently and effectively."
Resource levels, both budgetary and personnel, are a
further problem. The GAO reported that in 1979 the DOT
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The DOT does not know the
identity of all the firms it is
supposed to regulate, the kinds of
materials transported by these
carriers, nor the volume of
materials being shipped.
had only forty-nine'full-time hazardous materials inspectors,
and the 1979 Senate Commerce Committee concluded the
inspection forces of each of the various modal administra-
tions were "so small that they can make no more than a
token number of inspections of those parts of the industry
that they are responsible for." As a result, enforcement of
the federal safety regulations remains a goal to be pursued,
rather than a reality which has been attained.
Many spokesmen for the transportation industry com-
plain that the DOT's enforcement activities are less than
vigorous. While testifying before the Commerce Commit-
tee, one characterized the DOT's enforcement activities as
"'sporadic and poorly organized and directed," while anoth-
er referred to the DOT's enforcement program as "a laugh-
ing matter." A study of hazardous materials transportation
conducted by the National Research Council and released
in June 1983 criticized current safety enforcement ap-
proaches for the lack of a "consistent" relation between the
penalty and the gravity of the offense and characterized
such a program as "a disservice to the public."
Companies that do comply with the regulations feel
that they are at a competitive disadvantage against those
that do not comply. The result is a strong incentive toward
noncompliance. A study by the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) found another major cause for non-
compliance: the complexity of the regulations. The Nation-
al Research Council study concurred, finding a "pervasive
and unnecessary complexity that may in fact discourage the
very safety it proposes to assure." The NTSB found that
the hazardous materials regulations are so complicated that
some firms do not even try to comply with them. An official
of the port of Seattle perhaps stated it best when he de-
scribed the federal regulations as "fine print an inch and a
half thick, requiring a Ph.D. chemist and a Philadelphia law-
yer to read."
Thus, the federal safety program for hazardous materi-
als is characterized by many as a failure. An under-staffed
federal agency, relying on incomplete information, issues
regulations that industry cannot or will not comply with,
and yet the agency is unwilling to enforce compliance-
indeed, unable even to fully monitor noncompliance. It is
hardly surprising, then, that states and localities feel com,
pelled to issue their own sets of transportation safety regu,
lations. According to a spokesman for a national trade asso,
ciation of tank truck carriers, a major motivation for local
safety regulations has been "frustration borne of the reality
of minimal federal enforcement efforts."
LOCAL AND STATE SAFETY REGULATIONS
States and municipalities (as the administrative arms of
states) have long enjoyed the power to enact regulations
promoting the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.
This power, known as the police power, clearly extends to
highway safety regulations. The Supreme Court has held
that state or local regulations to promote highway safety
enjoy a strong presumption of validity against consitutional
attack. In Raymond Motor Transportation v. Rice, the
Supreme Court stated, -[In no field has ... deference to
state regulation been greater than that of highway safety
regulation." The obvious reason for according deference to
local safety regulations is that the local authorities are gen,
erally in the best position to consider problems unique to
their areas and to tailor their rules accordingly.
Nevertheless, state and local regulations promoting
transportation safety may be subject to attack on at least
two grounds. If the local requirements regulate an area in
which congressional action has been taken, they may be
preempted by the federal legislation. Second, local trans,
portation regulations may be struck down if they place a
burden on the flow of interstate commerce, under the Com,
merce Clausp of the Constitution. Each of these barriers to
local action needs to be explored more fully.
PREEMPTION UNDER THE HMTA
The federal statute covering hazardous materials transpor,
tation, the HMTA, contains an express provision (section
1811) which preempts "any requirements, of a state or
political subdivision thereof, which is inconsistent with any
requirement set forth in [the HMTA) or regulations issued
under [the HMTAJ." The provision makes clear that Con,
gress did not intend the HMTA and its regulations to com-
pletely occupy the field of hazardous materials transporta,
tion so as to preclude any state action. According to a
INTHE PUBLIC INTEREST
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Senate Commerce Committee Report on the preemption
provision, Congress sought only "to preclude a multiplicity
of state and local regulations and the potential for varying
as well as conflicting regulations in the area of hazardous
materials transportation." Therefore, absent federal occu-
pation of the field, local or state safety measures will stand,
so long as they are deemed not "inconsistent."
The HMTA also contains a procedure whereby a local
regulation may be approved by the Secretary of Transpor-
tation even though the local law is inconsistent with federal
law or regulations. Such an inconsistent law is exempt from
preemption if the secretary finds that the law (1) affords an
equal or greater level of protection to the public than is af-
forded by the requirements of the HMTA or the regula-
tions issued by the DOT, and (2) does not unreasonably
burden commerce.
One problem that has developed is that, despite the
establishment of procedures for considering whether local
safety requirements are "'inconsistent" with, or exempt
from, the federal regulations, there is no requirement that a
local government seek the approval of the Secretary in ad-
vance of putting into effect local regulations dealing with
the transportation of hazardous materials. In other words, if
a local government deems its regulations to be not inconsis-
tent with federal law, it can put them into effect subject to
challenge by a party who contends otherwise. Transporta-
tion industry spokesmen complain bitterly that the laxity of
this requirement allows localities to enact a myriad of in-
consistent regulations leaving transportation firms with the
double burden of challenging the regulations as inconsistent
while at the same time attempting to keep abreast of these
local requirements and comply with them. Local officials
respond that the failure of the federal safety efforts leaves
them no choice but to try to protect their citizens through
local ordinances.
A party objecting to a local requirement may either
bring an "inconsistency proceeding" before the DOT or
may challenge the requirement in court. The federal statute
does not indicate who is to make a determination of incon-
sistency, but it has been held that DOT decisions represent
"advisory opinions" that do not bind the courts. Neverthe-
less, given the experience that the DOT has acquired in
these matters, courts may properly resort to the DOT'S
rulings for guidance.
Inconsistency requires more than a mere difference
between state and federal law. The nonfederal requirement
must actually conflict with the HMTA to be deemed incon-
sistent with it. The actual criterion applied is derived from
several Supreme Court cases and have been codified in the
regulations under HMTA. The question of inconsistency
involves consideration of two issues: (1) whether or not
compliance with both the federal and nonfederal require-
ments is physically possible, and (2) the extent to which the
nonfederal requirement is an obstacle to the achievement of
the full purposes of the HMTA. Therefore, a local or state
rule or regulation directly conflicts with the HMTA if it
hinders the achievement of the purpose of the HMTA,
which is to promote hazardous transportation safety.
COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITATIONS
As noted above, the Commerce Clause also acts to restrain
the powers of localities to enact safety regulations dealing
with hazardous materials requlations. The Commerce
Clause, which grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce.. . among the several States. . ." prevents
states from enacting laws which unduly burden commerce.
States are not prevented from enacting laws which affect
interstate commerce provided that the laws serve a legiti-
mate state interest and that they do not discriminate
against interstate commerce.
Highway safety has long been recognized as a legitimate
state concern, and, consequently, courts have been reluc-
tant to invalidate state safety regulations as violative of
the Commerce Clause. However, in Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways, the Supreme Court decided that mere "incan-
tation of a purpose to promote the public health or safety
does not insulate a State law from Commerce Clause at-
tack." A conflict between the legitimate state interests of
safety and the national interest in the free flow of interstate
commerce is resolved by balancing the nature of the local in-
terest involved and the means used to promote the interest
against the degree of interference imposed on interstate
commerce. The rule followed by the Supreme Court in Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., provides that "where the [state]
statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden im-
posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to
the putative local benefits." In applying this test in the area
of hazardous materials transportation regulations, courts
will look to the safety interest sought to be protected, the
means chosen to do so, and the impact of those means on
interstate commerce, often measured by the compliance
costs imposed on highway carriers.
SOME LOCAL REQUIREMENTS CONSIDERED
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the limitations that
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statutory preemption and Commerce Clause considerations
impose on the ability of localities to regulate hazardous
materials transportation is to consider how specific local
regulations have fared under challenges before the DOT
and the courts. For this purpose, regulations governing the
transportation of some types of hazardous materials enacted
by the Cities of Boston and New York and by the State of
Rhode Island will be considered. Each of these local regula-
tory approaches have been challenged in inconsistency
hearings before the DOT and in the federal courts. Among
these three sets of local regulations, most of the typical
types of local action can be seen, so that it is possible, after
consideration of various rulings as to their validity, to set
forth with reasonable certainty precisely what regulatory
action a locality may or may not take.
NEW YORK CITY
Radioactive Materials
Two local regulatory actions taken by New York City deal,
ing with the transportation of hazardous materials have
been challenged on statutory and constitutional grounds. A
section of the city's Health Code4 bans the transportation
of most radioactive materials through the city. Several pro-
visions of the city's fire department regulations restrict the
transportation of hazardous gases by tank truck within the
city. Each of these actions have been determined to be
based upon the legitimate local safety concerns of the
densely populated city and have been sustained as valid.
The Health Code'provision bans the commercial trans-
port into or through the city of large-quantity or high-level
radiQactive materials. The directors of the Brookhaven Na-
tional Laboratories, seeking to ship spent nuclear fuel from
Long Island through the city by truck, sought a declaration
from the DOT that the city's regulation was inconsistent
with HMTA and DOT regulations. On April 20, 1978, the
DOT denied the request, ruling that the city regulation
was in effect a routing requirement and that, although the
DOT had the power to preempt local routing rules, the
agency had not yet exercised that power. Since no federaf
routing requirement existed, the city regulation was not
preempted. In making its determination, the DOT noted
that the city's action was related to its extreme population
density, as a result of which "the consequences of a major
accident are too extreme to be tolerable, however remote
the probability."
Yet, while refusing to find the rule inconsistent, the
DOT suggested that it disapproved of the city's regulation.
The DOT questioned whether it was prudent or fair to
allow local governments to ban transportation of hazardous
materials within their jurisdictions, given the likelihood
that neighboring jurisdictions might reciprocate. According
to the DOT, "a proliferation of local bans like [New York
City's] dealing with hazardous materials carriage will result
in a disrupted national transportation network that is at
best confusing, at worst chaotic, and neither condition ad-
vances transportation safety."
It was apparently these concerns that led the DOT to
attempt to overturn New York City's health regulations by
promulgating a uniform national rule regarding transporta,
tion of radioactive materials. The rule, HM-164, was pub,
lished on January 19, 1981, and was scheduled to take ef,
fect on February 1, 1982. It would have permitted the ship,
ment by road throughout the nation of all types of radio,
active materials. One avowed purpose of the rule was to
override local prohibitions against the shipment of radio,
active materials, particularly New York City's health
regulation.
The city brought suit to invalidate the rule or, alterna,
tively, to prevent it from overriding the city's regulation.
On May 5, 1982, in City of New York v. U.S. Department of
Transportation, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York invalidated the rule insofar as it over,
rode nonfederal bans on truck transportation of large,
quantity radioactive materials shipments through densely
populated areas such as New York City. While holding
that the final rule was, in general, reasonably within the
DOT's authority, the court found that the DOT had failed
to consider alternatives to truck transport (namely, ship,
ment by barge) and had inadequately assessed the risks of
highway transport in populous areas and the need, given
potential alternatives, to impose those risks on the public.
Therefore, the agency had not developed a sufficient ad,
ministrative record necessary to justify a rule, and thus the
DOT's adoption of the challenged rule was "arbitrary and
capricious."
However, rather than invalidate the rule in its entirety,
the court only enjoined enforcement of it in New York
City. Other jurisdictions seeking to restrict the transporta,
tion of radioactive materials within their borders were
directed to apply to the DOT for a ruling that the local ban
was not overridden by the DOT rule. Upon a showing by
the locality that application of the rule might result in truck
transport through populous areas that present dangers of
high-consequence accidents, and presentation of evidence
of a safer, feasible alternative to such truck transport, the
DOT must then permit the local ban to remain in effect.
Thus, local ordinances or regulations governing the
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transportation of radioactive materials are held to a test dif-
ferent from those governing other types of nonnuclear
hazardous materials. The court in this case sustained a large
federal preeminence in one area: in matters of nuclear
materials transportation, the presumption is toward federal
leadership. Variations from the federal rule will likely come
only in very populous areas-major cities-and only where
a viable, safer alternative exists to truck transport, perhaps
only in cities with marine access. The court did not reach
the question of whether restrictions on nuclear transport
enacted by rural, nondensely populated areas are pre-
empted, but the suggestion is that such restrictions would
be. The DOT and the nuclear industry have appealed the
decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Hazardous Gases
Regulations promulgated by the New York City Fire De-
partments govern the transportation of hazardous gases by
tank truck.' These regulations prohibit such shipments
unless transporters obtain a permit from the city fire com-
missioner certifying that "no practical alternative route to
passage through the city exists." When permits are
granted, transporters are required to conform with routing
requirements (which avoid the most densely populated sec-
tions of the city) and curfews (no shipments between the
rush hours of 6:00-10:00 AM or 3:00-7:00 PM).
These requirements were challenged by the NTTC, a
trucking trade association, as an unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce and as preempted by HMTA and its
regulations. In a May 3, 1982, decision, National Tank
Truck Carriers, Inc. v. City of New York, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the validity of the
regulations.
In rejecting the Commerce Clause challenge to the
regulations, the court held that the routing and curfew
requirements were "based on a legitimate local safety inter-
est and do no impose a disproportionate burden on inter-
state conmerce." Rather, these requirements amounted to
mere "inconveniences" which are "not unconstitutionally
disproportionate when balanced against the public interest'
in avoiding a catastrophic accident in a densely populated
urban area."
Further, the regulations were "entirely consistent"
with the HMTA, its regulations, and their underlying pur-
poses. The curfew requirements did not conflict with a
regulation requiring that all "shipments of hazardous mate-
rials shall be transported without unnecessary delay," but
imposed "only a necessary delay" which could be elimi-
Inconsistency requires more than a
mere difference between state and
federal law. The nonfederal
requirement must actually conflict
with the HMTA to be deemed
inconsistent with it.
nated by better scheduling by the truckers. Nor did the
routing requirements stand as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the objectives of the HMTA, since the DOT
"has not issued, and cannot practicably issue, specific rout-
ing requirements for localities, whose own agencies are very
likely far better equipped to do so." Thus, the New York
City hazardous gas routing and curfew requirements were
deemed constitutional and not preempted by federal law.
RHODE ISLAND
Prompted by concern over serious accidents involving the
transportation of liquid energy gases (including natural gas
and petroleum) in other states, the Rhode Island legislature
directed the State Division of Public Utilities and Carriers
to promulgate regulations covering such transportation
within the state. These rules and regulations, issued in
November 1978, cover transport of these gases over the
highways, streets, and roads of the state to be used by a
public utility, whether in intrastate commerce or in inter-
state commerce in which the loading and unloading of tank
trailers is to be performed within Rhode Island.
The regulations represented a detailed attempt by the
state "to regulate the transportation of hazardous materials
... within the boundaries and/or over the highways and
roads of this state" (NTTC v. Burke), but it should be
noted that the rules impacted on only some of the Liquified
National Gas (LNG) transports in the state-not all.
Nevertheless, the regulations reached many varied aspects
of hazardous gas transportation. The central requirement
was the obtaining of a state permit before any hazardous
gas transportation was conducted within the state. The
permit could only be obtained at least four hours prior to
each transport and a separate permit was needed for each
shipment within the state. The permit application required
the carrier to specify, among other things, the date and time





of the shipment, the route to be followed, and the type and
amount of gas to be shipped.
The Rhode Island regulations further required carriers
to comply with the following operating requirements: no
transport of hazardous gases by truck during rush hours
(7:00-9:00 AM and 4:00-6:00 PM, Monday through Fri-
day); all vehicles, whether loaded or empty, were required
to travel with their headlights on; and drivers were re-
quired to inspect vehicles for safety defects and leaks prior
to leaving and upon arrival. Additionally, there were three
equipment requirements: carriers had to have two-way
radios in their trucks, illuminated bumper signs containing a
warning, and "frangible-shank-type" locks to prevent
tampering with the valves on the truck. Finally, the state
regulations required immediate reporting of any accident or
safety irregularity to the State Police and the filing of a
written report with the Division of Public Utilities and
Carriers and the State Transportation Department within
twenty-four hours.
NTTC, the transportation industry association which
also challenged the validity of the New York City require-
ments, brought suit in federal court seeking an injunction
against enforcement of the Rhode Island rules and regula-
tions on the grounds that they were preempted by the
HMTA. At the same time, the state applied to the DOT
for a ruling on whether or not the regulations were inconsis-
tent with the HMTA. The district court issued a prelimi-
nary injunction against the three vehicle equipment require-
ments (two-way radios, bumper signs, and frangible locks),
finding that the requirements may well be invalid and that,
in order to comply with them, carriers would have to incur
substantial expenses. The court enjoined enforcement of
these three equipment requirements for a reasonable time.
As to the other regulations, the district court preferred to
await the DOT's determination on the issue of consistency.
The district court's issuance of the injunction was affirmed
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit prior to
any DOT ruling.
The DOT's inconsistency ruling was finally issued on
December 13, 1979. The DOT found the requirements con-
cerning the permit and application, curfew hours, subse-
quent written notice of accidents within twenty-four
hours, bumper signs, and frangible locks were inconsistent
with federal law and preempted. The state appealed within
the DOT, and the ruling was affirmed.
Because the DOT inconsistency rulings are not binding
on the courts, when the dispute moved to federal court, the
NTTC was able to seek a permanent injunction against all
the state requirements.
By this point, the state no longer sought to implement
the rules requiring rear bumper signs and frangible locks,
The district court, in National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v.
Burke, decided on March 17, 1982, that the requirements
concerning the permit, applications, curfew hours, and
written notice of accidents were inconsistent with federal
law and regulations. However, in the absence of any federal
requirements pertaining to twoway radios, illumination of
headlights, or vehicle inspections, the state's requirements
were not preempted. The requirement of immediately re,
porting accidents to the State Police was held to be consis,
tent with the purposes of the federal rules. These require,
ments were also deemed to have only a "minimal" impact
on interstate commerce,
However, Rhode Island's permit and application re,
quirements and the curfew restrictions were invalidated by
the district court as being likely to result in unnecessary
delays in conflict with federal regulations and as frustrating
one of the purposes of the HMTA-namely, uniformity of
regulation. The requirement of written notice of accidents
was invalidated as being duplicative of, and thus inconsis,
tent with, federal accident notification requirements. This
decision was affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals
in January 1983 in a brief memorandum opinion relying sub,
stantially upon the reasoning of the district court.
BOSTON
The City of Boston, Massachusetts, enacted on December
19, 1979, an ordinance governing the bulk transportation of
several types of hazardous materials within the city. The
ordinance and related regulations took effect on March 2,
1981. The regulatory scheme has been challenged by na,
tional and state trucking associations, and its validity is still
a live legal controversy. Despite the absence of resolution
on the issues raised by these local regulations, Boston's
requirements are of interest both for the approach they take
to safety regulations and for the scrutiny applied to them by
the DOT and the courts.
The Boston regulations apply only to the bulk transpor,
tation of large quantities of liquified petroleum gas, liquified
energy gas, and certain other flammable liquids and solids.
Also covered is the transportation in any quantity of cer-
tain explosives, poisionous gases, and radioactive materials.
The regulations are thus tailored to affect transportation of
only large shipments of the most dangerous substances.
The rules were aimed at controlling and reducing the
inherent dangers of the movement of these materials in the
city's densely populous downtown area. The rules impose a
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Variations from the federal rule
will likely come only in very
populous areas-major cities-
and only where a viable, safer
alternative exists to truck
transport, perhaps only in cities
with marine access.
ban on the use of streets in the downtown area for the
transportation of the described hazardous materials on
weekdays between 6:00 AM and 8:00 PM. Further, the
rules also preclude the use of any city streets, at any time,
for transportation of materials whose point of origin or des-
tination is outside the city. Upon application to the city fire
commissioner, exceptions to these regulations may be made
by permit, after a showing of "compelling need" consistent
with the "public interest." Vehicles operating under such a
permitted exception to the rules must carry the permit and
display a decal at all times. Additional decals must be
displayed on all regulated vehicles, whether or not exemp-
ted from the rules, identifying the product carried. Finally,
regulated vehicles must comply with existing local and
federal traffic regulations, travel three hundred feet apart
from each other, drive with their headlights on, and use on-
ly designated streets.
Transportation industry officials have singled out
Boston's local requirements as being particularly burden-
some to carriers. While complaining generally against the
proliferation of local laws impacting on hazardous materials
transportation before the Senate Commerce Committee,
one industry spokesman stated, "the ordinances for the Ci-
ty of Boston are perhaps classic." According to the spokes-
man, "a 6:00 AM to 8:00 PM ban exists, and violators are
subject to civil and criminal penalties, but for purchasing
$600 worth of permits from the city, a carrier may conduct
business as usual." The spokesman concluued that the net
result of these individual safety measures was to "create
impossible burdens on shippers and carriers" of hazardous
materials.
On the very day the Boston ordinance and regulations
took effect, trucking associations challenging their validity
won a temporary restraining order preventing implementa-
tion of the rules. A short time later, in an inconsistency rul-
ing issued on March 20, 1981, the DOT found major por-
tions of the Boston requirements inconsistent with federal
laws and regulations, and therefore preempted.
The DOT had two major criticism of the Boston rules.
First, the requirements concerning the daytime curfew and
the ban on downtown transport were deemed likely to
force hazardous materials shipments to be routed around
the city, adding to the travel time of these shipments and
thus resulting in "unnecessary delay" in conflict with
federal regulations under the HMTA. Second, the DOT
took issue with the process used by Boston to make deci-
sions with safety implications reaching beyond its jurisdic-
tional boarders. The DOT stated, "for consistency with
the HMTA, Boston must act through a process that ade-
quately weighs the full consequences of its routing choices
and ensures the safety of citizens in other jurisdictions that
will be affected by its rules." The DOT ruled that the pro-
cess used by Boston failed to adequately address these con-
cerns. Therefore the ban against use of city streets for
transport of hazris materials, the daytime curfew, and
the permit system were inconsistent with the purposes of
the HMTA. Thus, they were preempted.
Additionally, the DOT also found the various require-
ments regarding vehicle identification decals to be inconsis-
tent with the HMTA. Any such identification decals were
duplicative of federally required placards and thus stood as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the purpose of the
federal regulations. The requirements regarding separation
distances between vehicles and the use of headlights were,
in the absence of any federal requirements, deemed to be
consistent by the DOT.
The Boston regulations were simultaneously challenged
in federal court. On April 6, 1981, the U.S. District court
for Massachusetts, in American Trucking Associations v.
City of Boston, rejected most of the DOT's analysis and, for
the most part, denied a preliminary injunction against en-
forcement of the Boston regulations. The district court
referred to the DOT's inconsistency opinion but noted
that, on the issue of the process used by Boston in devising
its rules, the proposed regulations were submitted to the
State Department of Public Safety for approval and were
commented on by the fire marshals of neighboring jurisdic-
tions. This information had not been made available to the
DOT. Therefore, the court held that it might find the
downtown ban and curfew fully consistent with federal law
and refused to issue the injunction. However, the court did
find the decal and permit requirements unduly burdensome
and enjoined their enforcement.
Since this decision, Boston has sought appeal of the
DOT's original finding of inconsistency within the DOT. In
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an April 16, 1982, appeal decision, the DOT retreated from
many of its previous conclusions and rendered an "indeter-
minate" ruling, finding it impossible to render a precise deci-
sion on the question of preemption, given the factual dis-
pute over the amount of input received by citizens outside
Boston affected by the Boston rules. Pending a trial on the
merits in district court, scheduled to begin in September
1983, Boston's rules, for the most part, remain in place.
The passage of the Hazardous Materials Transportation
Act in 1975 signaled a large federal entry into the field of
hazardous materials transportation safety. Nevertheless, as
this article demonstrates, the federal role is not an exclusive
one; cities, towns, and states can and do play an important
part in supplementing and augmenting the federal goal of
"protectling] the Nation adequately against the risks to life
and property which are inherent in the transportation of
hazardous materials in commerce."
It is possible to outline the scope of permissible 16cal
safety regulations over hazardous materials transportation
by truck. Local governments have the most latitude in sub-
ject areas in which no federal rules exist. On this basis,
regulations requiring carriers to inspect their vehicles
before and after each shipment or to drive with lights illu-
minated have been upheld. Any equipment requirements
are likely to be preempted by the numerous federal rules on
the subject; but, again, where the federal rules are silent,
and where compliance costs are low relative to the safety
impact, localities may enact valid regulations. An example
of this is Rhode Island's two-way radio requirement, which
was sustained based upon the utility of the radios for
reporting accidents and the fact that most trucks are
already equipped with CB radios.
The two most difficult areas are curfew and routing re-
quirements. As for curfews, the safety impact of reducing
or preventing the possibilities of accidents during business
hours, when more people in downtown areas may be af-
fected, must be balanced against the possibilities of delay
likely to be encountered by transporters. Routing regula-
tions affecting nuclear materials must meet the re-
quirements set forth in City of New York v. United States
Department of Transportation. Routing rules over non,
nuclear materials are likely to be sustained if they appear
reasonably based upon safety considerations and are
enacted after consultation with other affected jurisdictions.
The HMsATA's preemption clause allows localities to
play an important role in hazardous materials transporta-
tion safety. The danger, of course, is that a multiplicity of
local rules will make it much more difficult and expensive
for carriers to legally transport the important products and
materials. Nevertheless, some degree of local input and con,
trol is desirable given the capabilities of localities to fashion
their requirements to the needs and concerns of the local
area and the regulatory and enforcement gaps in the federal
program.
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